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State Agency-Based v. Central Panel Jurisdictions:
Is There a Deference?
By A. Michael Nolan*
I. INTRODUCTION
When asked to address the student body of Duke Law School in
June 1989, Supreme Court Associate Justice Antonin Gregory
Scalia1 planned to deliver a speech filled with commentary
concerning some of the top legal issues of the day, including "Law
and Astrology."2 His plans unexpectedly were thwarted. In his
presentation, Justice Scalia reflected:
* A. Michael Nolan was appointed, on January 1, 1990, as one of the original
Administrative Law Judges to serve the Maryland Office of Administrative
Hearings (OAH). In that capacity, Judge Nolan has conducted hundreds of
hearings, as well as mediations and settlement conferences, in a wide range of
administrative law subject areas. He is recognized as a specialist at the OAH in the
areas of Motor Vehicle Administration law and Child Support Enforcement law.
Prior to his appointment as an ALJ, Judge Nolan was a Hearing Officer for the
Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration and, prior to that, a District Court
Commissioner for the District Court of Maryland for Anne Arundel County. He
graduated with a B.S. in Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice from the
University of Baltimore and received his law degree from the University of
Baltimore School of Law, cum laude. Judge Nolan has been active in the National
Association of Administrative Law Judges (NAALJ). From 2001 through 2004 he
served on the Board of Governors and then served as Secretary of that organization
until 2006. I would like to thank my God, my wife for her patience and Judges
Dewberry, Murray and Shaffer of OAH for their guidance and support. I couldn't
have done this without them.
1. President Ronald Reagan appointed Justice Scalia to the Court on
September 26, 1986.
2. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of
Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 511 (1989).
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I was advised ... that the subject of this lecture series
is administrative law, and so I have had to limit
myself accordingly. Administrative law is not for
sissies - so you should lean back, clutch the sides of
your chairs, and steel yourselves for a pretty dull
lecture. There will be a quiz afterwards. 3
Thus forewarned about the potential for tedium in this paper, I
will delve into the quagmire of administrative law, with a focus on
the administrative agency decision-making function and, in
particular, the judicial review of these decisions. The reviewing
courts generally grant great favor to the agency's interpretation of
statutory terms, or the validity of regulations promulgated by the
agency based upon such interpretations. This is true in both the
federal and state administrative systems. Not surprisingly, this trend
has generated a huge body of law. Essentially, this favorable
treatment, known as "deference," refers to the degree that a reviewing
judge or court accepts an agency's interpretation of statutory terms, or
regulations issued by the agency pursuant to a statute as a reasonable
interpretation and application of the statute.
There are two primary types of deference in the administrative
justice system. The first of these, which I will refer to as intra-
executive deference, involves the level of deference that is given by
an agency to proposed decisions rendered by hearing officers or
Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) who conduct hearings on the
agency's behalf. This varies widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
In some situations, the state's Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
or the agency's enabling statutes actually require an agency to defer
to factual findings the ALJ makes or to the legal conclusions the ALJ
reaches. These APA provisions commonly require appellate court
action to modify the agency's final order to enforce these intra-
executive branch deference requirements. 4 An excellent example of
this statutory control of intra-executive deference can be found in
Florida's APA, which limits what an agency may modify in an ALJ
3. Id.
4. For example, a final order may be reversed for a material error in procedure
that impaired the fairness of the proceedings. See, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.68(7)(c)
decision that is not a final order.5 When an appellate court modifies
an agency's final order that was based on statutory allocations of
roles between agencies and ALJs, the court is actually enforcing a
legislative choice, not choosing the level of deference an agency
owes to the AL. This type of intra-executive deference is
sufficiently involved that it should be the focus of an entirely
separate article; I will not discuss it further here. This article
addresses the second type of deference, which I will call extra-
executive deference. This deference is afforded to administrative
agencies by judicial courts reviewing the final administrative agency
decisions. Before getting into the main discussion, however, I believe
5. The Florida APA significantly restricts modifications an agency may make
in its final order to the AU's conclusions of law or to the findings of fact:
The agency may adopt the recommended order as the final
order of the agency. The agency in its final order may reject or
modify the conclusions of law over which it has substantive
jurisdiction and interpretation of administrative rules over which
it has substantive jurisdiction. When rejecting or modifying such
conclusion of law or interpretation of administrative rule, the
agency must state with particularity its reasons for rejecting or
modifying such conclusion of law or interpretation of
administrative rule and must make a finding that its substituted
conclusion of law or interpretation of administrative rule is as or
more reasonable than that which was rejected or modified.
Rejection or modification of conclusions of law may not form the
basis for rejection or modification of findings of fact. The agency
may not reject or modify the findings of fact unless the agency
first determines from a review of the entire record, and states
with particularity in the order, that the findings of fact were not
based upon competent substantial evidence or that the
proceedings on which the findings were based did not comply
with essential requirements of law. The agency may accept the
recommended penalty in a recommended order, but may not
reduce or increase it without a review of the complete record and
without stating with particularity its reasons therefore in the
order, by citing to the record in justifying the action.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.57(1)().
The significant limitation on modifications to conclusions of law "over which
[the agency] has substantive jurisdiction" precludes an agency from overruling a
presiding AL's decision to grant a continuance or to exclude an expert opinion
that hadn't been disclosed as the pretrial order required, by characterizing the
ALJ's ruling as a legal conclusion the agency is free to change. Agencies have no
"substantive jurisdiction" over trial procedure.
3Spring 2009 Is There a Deference?
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some discussion of the history of the development of administrative
law would be informative and beneficial towards understanding the
underlying concepts.
Simply put, an administrative agency is an entity established by
the government, whether federal, state, or local, to carry out some
part of that government's purpose. When the government perceives
that there is a significant public need, the most likely governmental
reaction is the creation of a new agency, or, more frequently, the
expansion of the powers and responsibilities of an existing agency.
6
Clearly, when the government creates or modifies an agency, it
implicitly grants to that agency the authority to carry out the public's
purposes. As long as the initial delegation of authority by the
legislature is proper and the administrative agency complies with the
APA or other controlling legislation, it may adopt regulations to
further its goals. It is important to remember that an agency has only
the power and authority delegated to it by the creating body, and
cannot exceed the scope of that power.
Agencies, whether federal or state, generally are established by a
legislative body. The statute establishing an agency must clearly
define the agency's purpose, powers, and procedures; its structure;
and its location within the government. An administrative agency has
three basic functions. First and foremost, as a component of the
Executive branch of government, the agency must carry out
effectively the function for which it was established. In the course of
carrying out the legislative directive, however, the agency effectively
functions in a quasi-legislative fashion, as it must further refine the
statute through the adoption of policies and regulations. These have
the effect of interpreting and clarifying the enabling statute and
carrying out the agency's role (rulemaking). Finally, the agency also
performs a quasi-judicial role, as it must apply evenly the regulations
it creates to particular cases and enforce this application
(adjudication).
The concept of an administrative agency possessing the power to
act in a legislative capacity or, for that matter to act in a judicial
capacity is, at first blush, somewhat troubling on a constitutional
basis, as these functions are within the sole purview of the
governmental branches. Questions regarding the constitutionality of
6. See infra note 8 and accompanying text.
the administrative agency system have been resolved consistently by
the courts in the agency's favor for three basic reasons. First, agency
rulemaking and adjudication have long pedigrees. In 1789, the first
Congress created agencies with rule making power and the ability to
render binding decisions. In addition, the agencies are comprised of
persons with specialized knowledge in their area of authority and
thus are better qualified to handle the agency's responsibilities than
the legislative bodies. Finally, the government could not perform the
variety of functions currently handled without agencies to make basic
rules and handle disputes. 7
The establishment of administrative agencies simplified the
government's process, and enabled the government to complete its
work more directly than if the legislature did the job by enacting a
law and the courts applied that law in various cases. Government
agencies regulate various and diverse actions of businesses and
citizens. Some agencies are involved in determining the rights of
citizens, such as professional and employee disciplinary actions;
professional business licenses and driver's license suspensions;
allegations of employment and housing discrimination; and
workmen's compensation claims. Other agencies enable the
operation of governmental programs, including government
entitlement programs such as food stamps, medical assistance, etc.;
public utilities, controlling utility rates etc.; retirement and pension
systems; special education; public safety; and corrections activities,
including inmate grievances and parole hearings.
Administrative law, as we know it, is a relatively recent
development. Although the first administrative agency was created
by Congress in 1789 to provide pensions for wounded Revolutionary
War soldiers, and other agencies were created during the late 1700s
to determine the amount of duties charged on imported goods, it was
not until 1887 that the first permanent administrative agency was
created. The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), created by the
Interstate Commerce Act,8 was enacted by Congress to regulate
commerce among the states, especially the interstate transportation of
persons or property by rail carriers. The ICC was designed to ensure
7. See RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 2-3 (Foundation Press
2008).
8. Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, 49 U.S.C. § 10101 (2009).
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that carriers involved in interstate commerce provided the public with
fair and reasonable rates and services. 9
In 1936, Supreme Court Justice Harlan Fiske Stone'0 addressed
the Conference on the Future of the Common Law, which was
presented as part of the Harvard Law School Tercentenary. Justice
Stone noted that when the field of administrative law was developed,
the legislative bodies took the unprecedented step of delegating
official authority to boards and commissions comprised of non-
judicial officers, rather than being handled by the court system. He
noted that establishment of administrative agencies was perceived
differently by other branches of law. He described the reception of
the agency concept as follows:
Under the civil law the rise of a system of
administrative law, independently of the courts, came
as a welcome formulation of principles for the
9. The Interstate Commerce Commission was created in response to pervasive
and growing anti-railroad agitation. Western farmers, especially those in rural
areas, believed that the railroads possessed economic power that they
systematically abused. To prevent further escalation of the hostilities, Congress
passed legislation enabling the creation of a five-member commission to monitor
and control any abuses. This concept was relatively unheard of in government, as it
placed power in the hands of a group of individuals rather than in a single person.
The ICA required the Commission to be politically diverse, with no more
than three of the five commission members representing any single political party,
and strict rules regarding length of the terms and limited bases for removal of
commissioners. The agency was empowered to issue "cease-and-desist" orders,
and to require "reparations" when a railroad violated the Act's terms. In creating
the ICC, then, the ICA seems to have pioneered the concept of a truly independent
government agency, but with obvious restrictions.
Although the Commission was empowered to issue orders and assess
penalties, these actions were only permitted after affording the suspected violator
due process, through a relatively formal trial-like proceeding. In addition, after the
Commission completed the process and issued a properly authorized order, its
authority ended; the agency had no enforcement role and only the courts had the
authority to enforce remedial actions against the railroads.
The Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act, 49 U.S.C. § 701
et seq. (2005), abolished the ICC and transferred its remaining regulatory duties to
the Surface Transportation Board (STB).
10. Justice Stone served as an Associate Justice from March 2, 1925 through
July 3, 1941, at which time President Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed him Chief
Justice. He served in that capacity until his death on April 22, 1946.
guidance of official actions w here no control had
existed before. To the common law the use of these
administrative agencies came as an encroachment
upon the established doctrine of the supremacy of the
courts over official action. "
Justice Stone referred to the rise of administrative law
since the establishment of the ICC, as "the most striking
change in the common law of this country." 12
The U.S. Constitution sets forth a framework for a system of
checks and balances to assure equality among the three branches of
the government. The specifics of these checks and balances, while
hinted at, were not clearly defined. \ltile the Constitution does not
actually authorize judicial review of legislative or executive
decisions, it does provide that the Court shall "interpret the law."
When the Constitution was developed, the creation of administrative
agencies had not even been contemplated. The concept of judicial
review in the early days of this country referred to the courts having
the power to void any legislative or executive act. or any part thereof.
if the Court determines that the act was not consistent with the
constitutional intent.
In 1803, the Supreme Court under Chief Justice John Marshall.
considered Marburi' v. Madison.i I a landmark case that firmly
established the concept of judicial review of the actions taken by the
other government branches. Marburv was the first case in which the
Supreme Court ruled an act of Congress unconstitutional.
The Court noted:
It is emnphaticallv the province and duty ol the
judicial department [the judicial branch] to say what
the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular
cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that
rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts
must decide on the operation of each.
11. Harlan Fiske Stone. Supreme Court Justice. Address at the Conference on
the Future of the Common Lawx at Harvard Law (Nl36) (emphasis added).
12. Harlan Fiske Stone. The Common Law In The Lited Stares, 50 HARV. L.
REv. 4. 16 (1I30.
13. Marburv \. Madison. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
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So if a law [e.g., a statute or treaty] be in
opposition to the constitution: if both the law and the
constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court
must either decide that case conformably to the law,
disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the
constitution, disregarding the law: the court must
determine which of these conflicting rules governs the
case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty....
If then the courts are to regard the constitution and
the constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the
legislature; the constitution, and not such ordinary act,
must govern the case to which they both apply....
Those then who controvert the principle that the
constitution is to be considered, in court, as a
paramount law, are reduced to the necessity of
maintaining that courts must close their eyes on the
constitution, and see only the law [e.g., the statute or
treaty]. . . . This doctrine would subvert the very
foundation of all written constitutions. 14
The Marbury ruling is still valid law. It clearly set forth the role
of the judiciary with regard to legislative utterances, and established
that the law is not necessarily what the statutes say it is, but what the
Court says it is. The concept of judicial deference to the legal and
factual determinations of administrative agencies, the principal focus
of this article, however, seemingly flies in the face of the Marbury
holding. In his 1989 speech to Duke University,15 Justice Scalia,
perhaps the most avid supporter on the Court of the concept of
reviewing courts deferring to the determinations of executive
agencies in certain situations when the statute enacted by a legislative
body is ambiguous, or otherwise has not clearly resolved a part of the
statute, noted:
It is not immediately apparent why a court should
ever accept the judgment of an executive agency on a
question of law. Indeed, on its face the suggestion
14. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177-78 (emphasis added).
15. See supra note 1.
seems quite incompatible with Marshall's aphorism
that "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is."' 6 Surely
the law, that immutable product of Congress, is what
it is, and its content - ultimately to be decided by the
courts cannot be altered or affected by what the
Executive thinks about it. I suppose it is harmless
enough to speak about "giving deference to the views
of the Executive"' concerning the meaning of a statute,
just as we speak of "giving deference to the views of
the Congress"' concerning the constitutionality of
particular legislation- the mealy-mouthed word
"deference"' not necessarily meaning anything more
than considering those views with attentiveness and
profound respect, before we reject them. But to say
that those views, if at least reasonable, will ever be
binding-that is, seemingly, a striking abdication of
judicial responsibility. 17
The law of administrative procedure has developed along with
the agencies to ensure that agencies do not abuse their authority. In
administrative adjudications, the strict rules observed in a courtroom
generally do not apply. Evidentiary rules are relaxed, even to the
extent that hearsay is often admissible. In all administrative hearings,
regardless of the agency involved, it is crucial that even though they
use simplified procedures, the process protect the public's due
process rights.
Some challenges to an agency's policies or regulations arise
when the rule or regulation is first proposed. More frequently,
however, individuals challenge the agency's application when the
agency attempts to enforce that rule or regulation. In most instances,
when faced with such a dispute, the individual or entity involved has
the right to request a hearing before the agency to dispute the
proposed agency action. These hearings are conducted by the agency
head, or more often, by hearing officers employed for that purpose.
There is a significant difference in focus between administrative
16. Marbur,, 5 U.S. at 177.
17. Scalia, supra note 2, at 513-14.
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adjudication and traditional judicial determinations. The agency is
obligated to represent the public interest in keeping with the enabling
legislation. By contrast, courts must remain completely impartial to
all of the parties before them.
II. THE HISTORY OF DEFERENCE1 8
From the outset, courts have been called upon to determine the
limit of government bodies' powers and to consider the weight to be
given to their decision-making. As early as 1810, the Supreme Court
noted in United States v. Vowell, "If the question had been doubtful,
the court would have respected the uniform construction which it is
understood has been given by the treasury department of the United
States upon similar questions."1 9
As the administrative agency system grew and became more
widespread, the courts developed several principles designed to limit
administrative action. These principles served to ensure that the
governmental bureaucracy acted in the public interest. Primary among
these principles was that of judicial review of decisions made by the
agencies.2" The approach favoring the agency interpretation is
predicated on the belief that when the legislature establishes a
government agency and grants that agency decision-making power,
courts ought to defer to that agency's reasonable interpretation of any
unclear terms of the statute that the agency administers.21 An
agencies' authority to establish regulations, and the true meaning
and intent of those regulations, appears to be the most frequently
contested area.
Development of the law in the area of deference has been
sporadic, at best. Richard L. Pierce, a professor of law at George
Washington University, noted that judicial review of agency
18. Although the primary focus of this article is on the state administrative law
system, I have focused the portion discussing the history of deference on the
federal system as the Supreme Court has spoken authoritatively on the applicable
issues.
19. United States v. Vowell, 9 U.S. 368, 372 (1810).
20. This review differs substantially from the standard of review for legislative
pronouncements.
21. See generally, Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974).
interpretations of statutes, which the agency implemented, was
"characterized by pervasive inconsistency and unpredictability." 22
Professor Pierce provided, as support for his analysis, several
of the Supreme Court's actions in 1944. In NLRB v. Hearst
Publications,23 a case involving the establishment of collective
bargaining for the employees, a five-justice majority of the Court
criticized the lower court for ignoring the agency's interpretation
of the term "employee." The Court upheld the agency's
interpretation of the term and instructed reviewing courts to
uphold an agency's construction of a statute that is administered
by the agency if it has a "reasonable basis in law." 24 The Court
stated:
Everyday experience in the administration of the
statute gives it familiarity with the circumstances and
backgrounds of employment relationships in various
industries, with the abilities and needs of the workers
for self organization and collective action, and with
the adaptability of collective bargaining for the
peaceful settlement of their disputes with their
employers. The experience thus acquired must be
brought frequently to bear on the question who is an
employee under the Act. Resolving that question, like
determining whether unfair labor practices have been
committed, 'belongs to the usual administrative
routine' of the Board. 25
In Davies Warehouse Company v. Bowles,26 decided in the
same term, a six-justice majority did precisely what the Hearst
Court warned reviewing courts against. In Davies, the Court
ignored the agency interpretation of a statutory term, and
substituted the Courts own "reasonable view," even though the
22. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 87 (Foundation Press
2008).
23. NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
24. Id. at 131.
25. Id. at 130.
26. Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144 (1944).
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Court acknowledged that the statute was ambiguous, and the
agency interpretation was sensible. 27 The Court reasoned:
Lastly, it is contended that we should accept the
Administrator's view in deference to administrative
construction. The administrative ruling in this case
was no sooner made than challenged. We cannot be
certain how far it was determined by the
considerations advanced, mistakenly as we think, in
its defense in this case. It has hardly seasoned or
broadened into a settled administrative practice. If
Congress had deemed it necessary or even appropriate
that the Administrator's order should in effect be final
in construing the scope of the national price-fixing
policy, it would not have been at a loss for words to
say so. We do not think it should overweigh the
considerations we have set forth as to the proper
construction of the statute. 28
Later in the same term, to muddy the waters even further, the
Court decided Skidmore v. Swift & Co. 29 In Skidmore, the Court
announced a somewhat confusing standard which courts have
interpreted to be a deferential standard of review in some cases,
but merely as an acknowledgement that the court would be open to
agency persuasion in other cases. 30 The Skidmore Court stated:
We consider that the rulings, interpretations and
opinions of the Administrator under this Act, while
not controlling upon the courts by reason of their
authority, do constitute a body of experience and
informed judgment to which courts and litigants may
properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a
judgment in a particular case will depend upon the
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity
27. Id. at 150.
28. Id. at 156.
29. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
30. Id. at 140.
of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it
power to persuade, if lacking power to control.3'
In Morton v. Ruiz,32 decided thirty years later, the Supreme
Court clarified the issue regarding filling in gaps in the statutes
when it decreed that "[t]he power of an administrative agency to
administer a congressionally created . . .program" includes the
ability to make rules "to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by
Congress."33
In 1951, the Court considered a NLRB ruling where the Board
considered the evidence presented, but which ignored the AL's fact
finding and legal conclusions that were contrary to the Board's
opinion. In Universal Camera v. NLRB,34 the Court indicated its
disapproval of this practice by adding an additional qualification to
the substantial evidence test. The Court noted that the evidence
supporting the agency's conclusion must be substantial in
consideration of the record as a whole, and must include all of the
record, including the evidence that is not consistent with the agency's
conclusion. 35 The Court noted:
[C]ourts must now assume more responsibility for the
reasonableness and fairness of Labor Board decisions
than some courts have shown in the past. Congress has
imposed on [reviewing courts] the responsibility for
assuring that the Board keeps within reasonable
grounds. That responsibility is not less real because it
is limited to enforcing the requirement that evidence
appear substantial when viewed on the record as a
whole ... The Board's findings are entitled to respect;
but they must nonetheless be set aside when the record
before a Court of Appeals clearly precludes the
Board's decision from being justified by a fair estimate
31. Id. at 140 (emphasis added).
32. Ruiz, 415 U.S. at 199.
33. Id.
34. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
35. Id.
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of the worth of the testimony of witnesses or its
informed judgment on matters within its special
competence or both. 36
lli. THE CHEVRON TWO-STEP
Finally, in 1984, the Supreme Court issued what many feel was the
single most definitive instruction regarding deference to administrative
agencies. In Chevron US.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.,37 the Supreme Court performed a detailed analysis of
agency authority, and definitively determined the scope of
administrative and executive agencies' power to fill in these statutory
gaps. The Court set forth a detailed process and instructed that
reviewing courts should apply this test when called upon to analyze
an agency's power to regulate, both generally and in relation to a
specific statute.3 8 In Chevron, the Court considered whether the
agency's definition of a term in the Clean Air Act was appropriate. 39
The primary issue involved the Environmental Protection Agency's
"bubble" policy, which was designed to reduce costs to
manufacturers for installing pollution control equipment. 40  The
Chevron Court upheld the policy, and identified a two-step analysis
that a reviewing court should consider when reviewing an agency's
construction of a statute. First, the reviewing court should consider
whether the controlling or enabling statute has specifically spoken
on the exact issue that the agency seeks to regulate.4 1 If "Congress
has directly addressed the precise question at issue," then the
"intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the
court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress." 42
36. Id. at 490.
37. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
38. Id. at 842-43.
39. Id. at 859-62.
40. Id. at 855-56.
41. Id. at 842.
42. Id. at 843-44.
If, however, the court determines that Congress has
not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the
court does not simply impose its own construction on
the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an
administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,
the question for the court is whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.43
Effectively, Chevron established a presumption that that when
Congress has delegated regulatory power to an agency, to
whatever extent the statute is unclear or ambiguous, the reviewing
court must assume that Congress has granted the agency authority
to fill in the gaps in a reasonable way. There is no requirement that
the agency's response be the best option available under the
circumstances, merely that it be a reasonable interpretation under
the circumstances.
Since its publication, Chevron has been the controlling case in
the area of judicial deference to administrative interpretations and
rules. The decision has become the basis for any evaluation of the
allocation of authority among administrative agencies, the federal
courts, and state courts. Chevron essentially proclaimed that when
the plain words of a statute are ambiguous, it is the sole province
of the administrative agency responsible for overseeing the
implementation of that statute to determine precisely what the law
says. From the beginning, however, there has developed an
increasingly large body of law refuting the Chevron analysis.
Chevron deference does not apply to all agency interpretations of
statutes. Many of the battles over the Chevron analysis have settled
on whether the Chevron analysis should be applied, or whether
another approach is indicated. Several commentators have referred to
this as "Chevron Step Zero."44 Clearly, when the interpretation in
43. Id. at 843.
44. See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 224-26
(2006). (citing Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89
GEO. L.J. 833, 836 (2001) ("[T]he inquiry that must be made in deciding whether
courts should turn to the Chevron framework at all" can be called Chevron "step
zero."). See also Pierce, supra note 22.
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question results from formal adjudications or is agreed to after
rulemaking proceedings, which provided notice and an opportunity
for individuals or groups to comment, the Chevron analysis is
applicable; beyond that, it is difficult to define a set rule.
In Auer v. Robbins,45 the Court considered an interpretation of
the Fair Labor Standards Act regarding which employees should be
classified as overtime-exempt. Under regulations promulgated by the
Secretary of Labor, one requirement for exempt status was that the
employee was required to earn a specified minimum amount on a
salary basis, rather than an hourly rate.46 The Court held that an
agency's interpretation of its own regulation was entitled to
deference.47
In Christensen v. Harris County,48 the Court considered the
validity of an opinion letter from the Acting Administration of the
Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor, and whether
the opinion was due any deference. Finding that opinion letters were
not entitled to Chevron deference, the Court explained:
Here, however, we confront an interpretation
contained in an opinion letter, not one arrived at after,
for example, a formal adjudication or notice-and-
comment rulemaking. Interpretations such as those in
opinion letters-like interpretations contained in policy
statements, agency manuals, and enforcement
guidelines, all of which lack the force of law-do not
warrant Chevron-style deference. Instead,
interpretations contained in formats such as opinion
letters are "entitled to respect" under our decision in
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140, (1944),
but only to the extent that those interpretations have
the "power to persuade." As explained above, we find
unpersuasive the agency's interpretation of the statute
at issue in this case.
49
45. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
46. Id. at 455.
47. Id. at 462-63.
48. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
49. Id. at 587 (citations omitted).
The Christensen Court acknowledged that the framework of
deference set forth in Chevron applied to an agency's interpretation
that was contained in a regulation. In the case before the Court,
however, the Department of Labor's regulation itself did not address
the issue of compelled compensatory time. In response to the agency
position that deference was due under the Auer holding, the Court
found that even though the opinion letter arguably presented an
agency's interpretation of its own regulation, Auer deference was not
warranted.5" The Court clarified the Auer ruling, explaining that
deference under Auer was warranted only when the language of the
regulation under consideration was ambiguous.51 The Court declared:
The regulation in this case, however, is not ambiguous
- it is plainly permissive. To defer to the agency's
position would be to permit the agency, under the
guise of interpreting a regulation, to create de facto a
new regulation. Because the regulation is not
ambiguous on the issue of compelled compensatory
time, Auer deference is unwarranted. 52
Furthermore, in United States v. Mead Corp., the Court reviewed
a tariff classification ruling made by the United States Customs
Service. 5 The Court concluded that the ruling was not entitled to
Chevron deference. 54 Essentially, the Mead Court held that the
Chevron analysis should only be applied "when it appears that
Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules
carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming
deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority. 55
The issue in Mead involved a determination of when a federal
court is required to follow a federal agency's interpretation of a
statute it administers. As hinted in Christensen, and made clear in
50. Id. at 588.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 223-24.
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Mead, the court deliberately decided to substantially limit the
Chevron holding that an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous
statute should prevail, provided that it is "reasonable," effectively
preventing federal courts from interpreting statutes de novo.
Considering the Court rulings in Mead and Christensen, the
applicability of Chevron-style deference appears limited to situations
where an agency's statutory interpretation emerged from a formal
adjudication, a notice-and-comment rulemaking, or some other
comparable exercise of law-making authority. Where Chevron does
not apply, the agency's statutory interpretation is reviewed de novo
and will be considered as persuasive, but not conclusive, under the
provisions of the Court ruling in Skidmore. The amount of weight
given to an agency's statutory interpretation under Skidmore depends
upon "the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements and
all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to
control."56
In Barnhart v. Walton, the Court considered the Social Security
Administration's interpretation of statutory definition of
"disability. " 57 The agency held that the disabling condition must
last, or be expected to last, for at least 12 months. The Court
attempted to clarify the relationship between the rulings in Chevron,
Christensen, and Mead. The Court explained:
Regardless, the Agency's interpretation is one of long
standing. ... And the fact that the Agency previously
reached its interpretation through means less formal
than "notice and comment" rulemaking, see 5 U.S.C.
§ 553, does not automatically deprive that
interpretation of the judicial deference otherwise its
due. If this Court's opinion in Christensen v. Harris
County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000), suggested an absolute
rule to the contrary, our later opinion in United States
v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001), denied the
suggestion. Indeed, Mead pointed to instances in
which the Court has applied Chevron deference to
56. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
57. Bamhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002).
agency interpretations that did not emerge out of
notice-and-comment rulemaking. It indicated that
whether a court should give such deference depends in
significant part upon the interpretive method used and
the nature of the question at issue. And it discussed at
length why Chevron did not require deference in the
circumstances there present-a discussion that would
have been superfluous had the presence or absence of
notice-and-comment rulemaking been dispositive.5s
In applying the Chevron analysis to the facts presented in the
Barnhart case, and affirming the agency interpretation of the statute,
the Court declared:
In this case, the interstitial nature of the legal question,
the related expertise of the Agency, the importance of
the question to administration of the statute, the
complexity of that administration, and the careful
consideration the Agency has given the question over
a long period of time all indicate that Chevron
provides the appropriate legal lens through which to
view the legality of the Agency interpretation here at
issue. . . . For these reasons, we find the Agency's
interpretation lawful.' °
Several other cases in the Supreme Court have considered the
applicability of Chevron deference to specific interpretations by
government agencies. In National Cable & Telecommunication
Association v. Brand X hIternet Services, 60 the Court considered the
FCC interpretation that cable companies providing broadband
Internet services were exempt from regulation under the
Telecommunication Act, as they were information services, not
telecommunication services.
58. Id. at 221-22 (citations omitted).
59. Id. at 222 (citations omitted).
60. Nat'l Cable & Telecoim. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs.. 545 U.S. 967
(2005).
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The Court determined that simply because a statute, in this case
the Communications Act of 1934, as amended by the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, had previously been considered
and interpreted by other federal courts did not preclude a subsequent
determination by an agency that was charged with execution and
enforcement of the act. 61 The Majority theorized as follows:
A court's prior judicial construction of a statute trumps
an agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron
deference only if the prior court decision holds that its
construction follows from the unambiguous terms of
the statute and thus leaves no room for agency
discretion. This principle follows from Chevron itself.
Chevron established a "presumption that Congress,
when it left ambiguity in a statute meant for
implementation by an agency, understood that the
ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost, by
the agency, and desired the agency (rather than the
courts) to possess whatever degree of discretion the
ambiguity allows." Yet allowing a judicial precedent
to foreclose an agency from interpreting an ambiguous
statute, as the Court of Appeals assumed it could,
would allow a court's interpretation to override an
agency's. Chevron's premise is that it is for agencies,
not courts, to fill statutory gaps. The better rule is to
hold judicial interpretations contained in precedents to
the same demanding Chevron step one standard that
applies if the court is reviewing the agency's
construction on a blank slate: Only a judicial
precedent holding that the statute unambiguously
forecloses the agency's interpretation, and therefore
contains no gap for the agency to fill, displaces a
conflicting agency construction. 62
The Justices of the Supreme Court still remain sharply divided as
to applicability of deference, and the degree of deference, which
61. Id. at 982-83.
62. Id. (citations omitted).
should be accorded, in any given situation. For example, in Smith v.
City of Jackson,63 a 2005 case considering an EEOC interpretation
that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (Act) permitted
disparate-impact claims, the court ruled 8-0 that the case should be
dismissed.64 The Justices, however, took very different approaches in
reaching the same result. The plurality, including Justice Stevens,
Justice Ginsberg, Justice Souter, and Justice Breyer, held that the
statute itself permitted disparate-impact actions, and only looked to
the EEOC interpretation for support.
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor, with Justice Kennedy
and Justice Thomas, agreed with the plurality's final determination
that the case must be dismissed for failure to state a claim, but
disagreed with the plurality's conclusion that the Act allowed for
disparate-impact claims, noting that age discrimination differed
significantly from other forms of discrimination and that many
legitimate employment practices would impact differently on the
older workers. 65 The O'Connor concurrence also disagreed with
Justice Scalia's contention that the EEOC interpretation was due
Chevron deference, opining that "Quite simply, the agency has not
actually exercised its delegated authority to resolve any ambiguity in
the relevant provision's text, much less done so in a reasonable or
persuasive manner. As to the specific question presented, therefore,
the regulation is not entitled to any deference." 66
In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia, by far the most outspoken
Chevron advocate on the court, urged that this was an "absolutely
classic case for deference to agency interpretation." 67 Justice Scalia
noted in support of his position that the EEOC had been delegated
rulemaking authority, had promulgated a regulation after full
opportunity for notice and comment, had published a statement with
the regulation supporting disparate-impact claims, and had defended
that application in several court cases. Justice Scalia then explained:
63. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 228 (2005).
64. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist took no part in the decision.
65. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
66. Id. at 265 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
67. Id. at 243 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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The statement of the EEOC which accompanied
publication of the agency's final interpretation of the
ADEA said the following regarding this regulation:
"Paragraph (d) of § 1625.7 has been rewritten to make
it clear that employment criteria that are age-neutral
on their face but which nevertheless have a disparate
impact on members of the protected age group must
be justified as a business necessity. . . . The regulation
affirmed, moreover, what had been the longstanding
position of the Department of Labor, the agency that
previously administered the ADEA .... And finally,
the Commission has appeared in numerous cases in
the lower courts, both as a party and as amicus curiae,
to defend the position that the ADEA authorizes
disparate-impact claims . . . the EEOC's reasonable
view that the ADEA authorizes disparate-impact
claims is deserving of deference .... A fortiori, it is
entitled to deference under the pre- Mead formulation
of Chevron, to which I continue to adhere. 68
IV. STATE AND LOCAL AGENCIES
State and local governments also create administrative agencies,
many of which mirror federal agencies. Thus, the individual states
have agencies that control transportation, public health, public
assistance, education, natural resources, labor, law enforcement,
agriculture, commerce, and revenue. State agencies often develop
regulations that differ from those promulgated by their federal
counterparts. In the spirit of administrative agency, state and local
governments also create agencies that help address compelling,
peculiarly local concerns.
In many cases, the ability to conduct hearings is delegated by the
legislature to state and local administrative agencies regarding
challenges to the agency's actions, or to provide information to assist
the agency in carrying out its mission. Traditionally, these hearings
were conducted by the agency head, an administrative board or
tribunal, or by hearing officers employed by the agency involved.
68. Id. at 245 (citations omitted).
More recently, however, there is, at a state level, a trend toward
creating a central panel of hearing officers, frequently called
Administrative Law Judges (ALJs), who handle hearings for several
different agencies, but who are employed by a separate and
independent government agency. 69
The Central panel concept is described on the webpage of the
National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary (NAALJ) as
follows:
More than half of the states plus the cities of New
York and Chicago, as well as the District of
Columbia, in large part, have taken the administrative
law judge function from the executive agency and
have placed that function into a separate agency. This
separate agency, created solely for the purpose of
adjudication, is sometimes called a Central Panel, or,
more specifically, a Central Hearing Agency (CHA)
or Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).
Many CHA states have only two or three agencies
within their jurisdiction, while other states have a full
panoply of responsibility. Indeed, there may be states
included which, upon scrutiny, may not have
completely severed the adjudicatory function from
executive agencies.
70
In some of the appeals heard by the Central panel, the ALJ
prepares a recommended decision, which then is presented to the
agency with proposed findings of fact and proposed conclusions of
law. The agency then evaluates the recommendations, and issues the
69. As of this writing twenty-six states have created central panels of various
sizes and with varied jurisdiction. These states are: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona,
California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming. In addition three cities have developed central panel hearing agencies:
Chicago, Illinois, the District of Columbia, and New York, New York.
70. National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary,
http://www.naalj.org/panel.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2009).
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final agency decision on the appeal. In many of the central panel
jurisdictions, however, or in at least a portion of the appeals
considered by the central panel in a jurisdiction, the agency
delegation includes the ability to render the final agency decision. If
the agency disagrees with the ruling, it must appeal that decision as
would any party to a dispute. In some cases, however, the agency is
"stuck" with the central panel decision. In Louisiana, for example,
the Division of Administrative Law (DAL) was created by the
legislature in 1996. The enabling statute provides, in pertinent part,
as follows:
Louisiana Revised Statute (LRS) 49:992.
B.
2. In an adjudication commenced by the division, the
administrative law judge shall issue the final decision
or order, whether or not on rehearing, and the agency
shall have no authority to override such decision or
order. Upon the issuance of such a final decision or
order, the agency or any official thereof shall comply
fully with the final order or decision of the
administrative law judge.
3.Nothing in this Section shall affect the right to or
manner of judicial appeal in any adjudication,
irrespective of whether or not such adjudication is
commenced by the division or by an agency.
However, no agency or official thereof, or other
person acting on behalf of an agency or official
thereof, shall be entitled to judicial review of a
decision made pursuant to this Chapter.7'
The constitutionality of the prohibition of agency appeals was
challenged in the Louisiana Supreme Court and subsequently upheld
in Wooley v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Ins. Co. 72 The case
involved an insurance form, which was found deficient by the
71. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:92 (2009).
72. Wooley v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Ins. Co. 893 So.2d 746 (La. 2005).
Commissioner of Insurance; therefore, the form could not be used in
Louisiana. State Farm requested a hearing, which was subsequently
conducted by an ALJ employed by the DAL.73 After the hearing, the
ALJ specifically found that the form complied in wording and
meaning with the applicable law. 74 He issued a decision in favor of
State Farm, ordering the Department of Insurance to approve the
RCU form as submitted by State Farm.75 The Commissioner
petitioned for judicial review to the District Court.76 The case worked
its way through the system, and ultimately was decided by the
Supreme Court of Louisiana. The Court held that the challenged
statutory provisions complied with the State constitution, and denied
the Commissioner's request.77 The Court explained:
Following the established principle that appeals by
state agencies of decisions made by other agencies are
disfavored in the absence of a statutory right of
appeal, we conclude that the Commissioner is not
entitled to appeal the decision of the ALJ. We see no
constitutional impediment to the legislature's decision
to deny such an appeal right to the Commissioner. We
have already recognized that the ALJ did not exercise
judicial power when he interpreted the law relating to
a traditionally regulatory matter, and the
Commissioner has not shown how the lack of a right
to appeal changes the nature of the power exercised by
the ALJ. We discern no violation of the requirement
of separation of powers. Instead of viewing the
Commissioner's lack of a right to appeal the AL's
adverse decision as a usurpation of judicial power, we
view it as a lack of procedural capacity on the part of
the Commissioner. The legislature has chosen to deny
the right of judicial review to one executive branch
office when another executive branch office has ruled
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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against it. Essentially, the legislature has chosen to
allow the ALJs to adjudicate, and in some cases to
finally adjudicate, various matters concerning the
insurance industry in this state and to reduce the
Commissioner's ability to regulate insurance by
prohibiting him from overriding the ALJs decision or
order and from seeking judicial review of an adverse
decision or order. While we recognize that one may
question the wisdom of this decision, it is within the
legislature's prerogative to make this change. As we
have stated repeatedly throughout this opinion, while
the Commissioner of Insurance is a constitutionally-
created office, the Commissioner has no
constitutionally-defined powers and duties. He has the
constitutional right to exist, but, in the absence of a
constitutional amendment, it is the legislature that has
the right to define his powers and duties. 78
In most jurisdictions, however, regardless who makes the final
agency decision, both the individual and the agency involved have
the right to have that determination reviewed by the courts. This
judicial review is one of the foundations of the administrative law
system.
While the Supreme Court was busy developing the varied
approaches to deference, each of the state courts was attempting to
adapt and create its own approach to the question of what deference
the reviewing court owes to the agency's decision. What has resulted
is a scattered body of law wherein deference is granted or denied
seemingly at the whim of the reviewing judge or panel. To illustrate
this contention, in 2001, before the D.C. Central Panel was
established, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals considered a
case which required the court to review a decision that was made by
the Director of the Department of Employment Services (DOES)
denying the Appellant relief from a special fund created under the
78. Id. at 769-70 (citations omitted).
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District of Columbia Workers' Compensation Act of 1979.' 9 The
ruling explained that jurisdiction's approach as follows:
The precise question at issue here is ultimately a
matter of law and this court remains "the final
authority on issues of statutory construction."
However, it is a firmly established rule in this
jurisdiction that "an agency's interpretation of its own
regulations or of the statute which it administers is
generally entitled to great deference from this court.".
. . To this end, "[o]rdinarily, therefore, this court will
not attempt to interpret the agency's statute until the
agency itself has done so .... Instead, we will remand
to permit the agency to engage in the necessary
analysis of the legislation it is charged with carrying
out." 80
Although this approach seems relatively straight-forward and
suggests that the courts generally will defer to the agency's
interpretation, the Court enunciated a restrictive caveat applicable to
the agency's interpretation. The Court stated:
[T]he degree of deference to be accorded to such
agency interpretation is a function of the process by
which that interpretative ruling has been arrived at and
the degree to which the agency's administrative
experience and expertise have contributed to the
process. For example, "[w]hen it appears that the
agency (or, in this case, the Director) did not conduct
any analysis of the language, structure, or purpose of
the statutory provision, it would be incongruous to
accord substantial weight to [the] agency's
determination.... Likewise, "if the agency's decision
79. Genstar Stone Products Co. v. Dep't of Employment Servs., 777 A.2d 270
(D.C. 2001).
80. Id. at 272 -73 (citations omitted).
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is based upon a material misconception of the law, this
court will reject it."'"
On May 22, 2008, Judge Blackburne-Rigsby, writing for the D.C.
Court of Appeals, seemed to indicate that decisions rendered by ALJs
of the Office of Administrative Hearings would be entitled to
deference based on the same standard applied to an agency head's
decisions. The Court considered a student's petition for review of an
ALJ's final decision denying his request for reimbursement from the
District of Columbia Department of Human Services Rehabilitation
Service Agency (RSA) for tuition and other costs for his Fall 2005
semester at Beacon College. 82 Finding that the ALJ's decision was
not arbitrary or capricious and was based on substantial evidence, the
court noted:
In reviewing an OAH decision, we may reverse
only if the findings are not supported by substantial
evidence in the record or if the decision is grounded
on a mistaken legal premise or is an abuse of
discretion. Substantial evidence is "such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion." Substantial
evidence may exist to support a conclusion different
than the one reached by the ALJ, but this court may
not substitute its review of the record for that of the
ALJ.
The law is also well settled that "an agency's
interpretation of its own regulations or of the statute
which it administers is generally entitled to great
deference from this court.",83
Two months later, however, a different panel of judges from the
same court considered an ALJ's final decision regarding the
Department of Public Works (DPW) allegation that a property owner
81. Id. at 273 (citations omitted).
82. Takahashi v. D.C. Dep't of Human Servs., 952 A.2d 869 (D.C. 2008).
83. Id. at 874 (citations omitted).
violated the Litter Control Act.84 After an evidentiary hearing the
ALJ found no violation of the Act, although she did impose a fine on
the property owner for failing to timely respond to DPW's citation.
8 5
On appeal, Senior Judge Schweib held that no deference was due to
OAH decisions. Judge Schweib noted:
Although we accord appropriate weight to the
interpretation of a statute by the agency which is
charged with its enforcement, and which therefore
ordinarily has specialized expertise, the OAH is vested
with the responsibility for deciding administrative
appeals involving a substantial number of different
agencies. For this reason, it does not have the kind of
subject matter expertise with respect to the Litter
Control Act that would warrant deference on our part
when we interpret the statute. 86
It is apparent from these cases that the D.C. court is unsure which
approach to take, and it remains to be seen which approach will
prevail. While in most situations, each state is internally consistent,
the states widely differ from each other in their overall approach. For
example, the Michigan Supreme Court, in the decision of In re
Complaint of Rovas Against SBC Michigan, considered the Public
Service Commission's (PSC's) determination that a company
violated the Michigan Telecommunications Act by making false
statements to customers regarding the source of their
telecommunications problems. 87 The Court reaffirmed its support of
the holding rendered in Boyer-Campbell v. Fry.88 That decision held
that an agency's construction of a statute by those charged with the
duty of executing it is entitled to "the most respectful consideration"
and ought not to be overruled without sound reasons.89 The Court
clarified, however, that such constructions are not binding on the
84. Washington v. D.C. Dep't of Pub. Works, 954 A.2d 945 (D.C. 2008).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 948 (citations omitted).
87. In re Complaint of Rovas Against SBC Mich., 754 N.W.2d 259 (Mich.
2008).
88. Boyer-Campbell v. Fry, 260 N.W. 165 (Mich. 1935).
89. Id.
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courts. The Court explained that these interpretations serve as "an
aiding element" to be given weight in construing such laws and
acknowledged that the interpretation is sometimes deferred to when
not in conflict with the indicated spirit and purpose of the
legislature. 90
The Rovas court, while acknowledging that the agency decisions
were due some deference, specifically refused to adopt the Chevron
approach, stating:
While the Chevron inquiries are comparatively simple
to describe, they have proven very difficult to apply.
This Court has never adopted Chevron for review of
state administrative agencies' statutory interpretations,
and we decline to adopt it now. The vagaries of
Chevron jurisprudence do not provide a clear road
map for courts in this state to apply when reviewing
administrative decisions. Moreover, the unyielding
deference to agency statutory construction required by
Chevron conflicts with this state's administrative law
jurisprudence and with the separation of powers
principles discussed above by compelling delegation
of the judiciary's constitutional authority to construe
statutes to another branch of government. For these
reasons, we decline to import the federal regime into
Michigan's jurisprudence.9 1
The Rovas Court summarized Michigan's approach to agency
interpretations of statutes in terms very similar to those contained in
Skidmore as follows:
This case concerns judicial review of an
administrative agency's interpretation of a statute. This
Court has not always been precise in articulating the
proper standard for reviewing such interpretations.
However, in accordance with longstanding Michigan
90. Id._at 170.
91. In re Complaint of Rovas Against SBC Mich., 754 N.W.2d 271-72 (Mich.
2008).
precedent and basic separation of powers principles,
we hold and reaffirm that an agency's interpretation of
a statute is entitled to "respectful consideration, " but
courts may not abdicate their judicial responsibility to
interpret statutes by giving unfettered deference to an
agency's interpretation. Courts must respect legislative
decisions and interpret statutes according to their plain
language. An agency's interpretation, to the extent it is
persuasive, can aid in that endeavor.
92
Other States, however, have approached the question from a
different direction. The Texas Court of Appeals, in Public Utility
Commission of Texas v. Gulf States Utilities Co., applied a "plain
error" standard regarding an agency's approach to one of its own
regulations. 93 Considering a final order issued by the Public Utility
Commission in contested rate case, the Court stated:
The Commission's interpretation of its own
regulations is entitled to deference by the courts....
Our review is limited to determining whether the
administrative interpretation "is plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation." . . . However, if the
Commission has failed to follow the clear,
unambiguous language of its own regulation, we must
reverse its action as arbitrary and capricious. 94
In Combined Specialty Insurance Co. v. Deese, the Court
reviewed a decision by an appeals panel of the Texas Workers'
Compensation Commission (TWCC) denying an appeal filed with
the TWCC as untimely. 9' The court explained that it considered an
agency's interpretation to be "plainly erroneous" if it is
unreasonable. 96 By doing so, the Court expanded the deference
threshold to include not only a requirement that the agency's
92. Id. at 272 (emphasis added).
93. Pub. Utility Comm'n of Tex. v. Gulf States Utilities Co., 809 S.W.2d
201 (Tex. 1991).
94. Id. at 207 (citations omitted).
95. Combined Specialty Ins. Co. v. Deese, 266 S.W.3d 653 (Tex. App. 2008).
96. Id.
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interpretation not be arbitrary and capricious, but also that it be
reasonable. The Court explained:
Recently, we held that an agency's interpretation of a
statute it is charged with enforcing is entitled to
"serious consideration" by the courts, "so long as that
construction is reasonable and does not contradict the
plain language of the statute." . . . Similarly, we defer
to an agency's interpretation of its own rules "as long
as its interpretation is reasonable." 97
The Texas Court of Appeals provided a clear example of what it
considered to be an unreasonable interpretation of a rule by an
agency, in this case the TWCC. The Court stated:
[T]he principle of judicial deference does not require
blind obeisance to every agency determination ...
TWCC rules required it to send copies of all orders
both to the claimant and to the claimant's attorney, if
any. Claimant Frank, who was represented by counsel,
lost her hearing before a hearing officer, but the
TWCC sent the hearing officer's order to Frank alone,
and not to her attorney. Frank's attorney did not find
out about the order until thirty-seven days after the
TWCC mailed the decision to Frank. Even though he
filed a request for review with the appeals panel that
same day, the appeals panel dismissed the appeal as
untimely, interpreting the fifteen-day deadline to run
from Frank's receipt of the order. The trial court
dismissed Frank's suit for judicial review, but the
Austin Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the
TWCC's interpretation of the fifteen-day deadline was
so unreasonable that it was not entitled to deference.
The court noted that the dual-notice regulation was
plainly intended to protect claimants' rights by
ensuring that both the claimant and his or her attorney
received copies of all written communications from
97. Id. at 661 (citations omitted).
the TWCC. The appeals panel unreasonably
eviscerated the purpose of the dual-notice regulation
by holding that the fifteen-day appeal deadline was
triggered when the TWCC sent the decision to the
claimant without regard to when (or even if) it sent the
decision to the claimant's counsel. Accordingly, the
court of appeals rejected the TWCC's unreasonable
interpretation of its regulations, concluding that the
fifteen-day deadline did not begin to run until the
TWCC sent the decision to both the claimant and her
attorney. 98
As do many of the States, the Texas courts treat an agency's
interpretations of law differently from its interpretations of fact in
determining what deference is due to an Administrative Law Judge's
decision, as well as to which parts of that decision deference is due.
In Texas Department of Public Safety v. A/ford, the Texas Supreme
Court considered an appeal challenging an AL's final decision and
order authorizing the suspension of the licensee's commercial license
for two years for refusing to submit to a chemical test. 9' The Court
explained:
[W]hether there is substantial evidence to support an
administrative decision is a question of law, and on
questions of law, neither the trial court nor the
administrative law judge is entitled to deference on
appeal. Irrespective of the administrative law judge's
mistake in referencing the statute, there was
substantive evidence to support his findings [of fact],
which are entitled to deference, and his ultimate
decision. 100
The Wisconsin courts have instituted a multi-layer system of
deference based on the agency's level of experience dealing with the
98. Id. at 661-62 (citations omitted).
99. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Alford, 209 S.W.3d 101 (Tex. App. 2006).
100. Id. at 103.
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area in question. The Wisconsin Supreme Court summarized its three
levels of deference as follows:
A reviewing court accords an interpretation of a
statute by an administrative agency one of three levels
of deference-great weight, due weight or no
deference-based on the agency's expertise in the area
of law at issue.
An agency's interpretation of a statute is entitled
to great weight deference when: (1) the agency was
charged by the legislature with the duty of
administering the statute; (2) the interpretation of the
agency is one of long-standing; (3) the agency
employed its expertise or specialized knowledge in
forming the interpretation; and (4) the agency's
interpretation will provide uniformity in the
application of the statute.
We grant an intermediate level of deference, due
weight, "where an agency has some experience in the
area, but has not developed any particular expertise in
interpreting and applying the statute at hand" that
would put the agency in a better position to interpret
the statute than a reviewing court.
We apply de novo review when "there is no
evidence that the agency has any special expertise or
experience interpreting the statute[,] . . .the issue
before the agency is clearly one of first impression, or
* * * the agency's position on an issue has been so
inconsistent so as to provide no real guidance." 10 1
Interestingly, the Wisconsin Court noted that under the "due
weight" standard, there are times when a reviewing court is justified
in replacing the agency's judgment with its own. The Court
explained:
101. County of Dane v. Labor & Indust. Review Comm'n, 744 N.W.2d 613,
615-16 (Wis. 2007) (emphasis added).
The deference allowed an administrative agency under
due weight is not so much based upon its knowledge
or skill as it is on the fact that the legislature has
charged the agency with the enforcement of the statute
in question. [Under the due weight standard] . . . a
court will not overturn a reasonable agency decision
that comports with the purpose of the statute unless
the court determines that there is a more reasonable
interpretation available. 102
The Maryland courts have consistently supported deference to a
final agency decision. Judge Eldridge, a recognized expert in
Maryland administrative law described the Maryland approach as
follows:
A court's role in reviewing an administrative
agency adjudicatory decision is narrow, it "is limited
to determining if there is substantial evidence in the
record as a whole to support the agency's findings and
conclusions, and to determine if the administrative
decision is premised upon an erroneous conclusion of
law."
In applying the substantial evidence test, a
reviewing court decides whether a reasoning mind
reasonably could have reached the factual conclusion
the agency reached. A reviewing court should defer to
the agency's fact-finding and drawing of inferences if
they are supported by the record. A reviewing court
"must review the agency's decision in the light most
favorable to it; ... the agency's decision is prima facie
correct and presumed valid, and ... it is the agency's
province to resolve conflicting evidence" and to draw
inferences from that evidence.
Despite some unfortunate language that has crept
into a few of our opinions, a 'court's task on review is
not to substitute its judgment for the expertise of those
persons who constitute the administrative agency.
102. Id. at 834 (citations omitted).
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Even with regard to some legal issues, a degree of
deference should often be accorded the position of the
administrative agency. Thus, an administrative
agency's interpretation and application of the statute,
which the agency administers, should ordinarily be
given considerable weight by reviewing courts.
Furthermore, the expertise of the agency in its own
field should be respected. '03
In Tabassi v. Carroll County Department of Social Services, a
case challenging the Office of Administrative Hearings' (OAH's)
interpretation of a statute, the Appellant was an individual who had
been accused of child neglect and as a result, his name would be
entered in the State's central registry of child abusers and neglectors.
104 He sought judicial review of the (OAH's) dismissal of his appeal
without the opportunity for a contested case hearing.' 05 The dismissal
under appeal resulted from the individual's conviction for reckless
endangerment and child access to firearms in a related criminal
proceeding.10 6 Finding that the circumstances failed to satisfy the
103. Marzullo v. Kahl, 783 A.2d 169, 176-77 (Md. 2001) (citations
omitted).
104. Tabassi v. Carroll County Dep't of Social Servs, 957 A.2d 620 (Md.
2008).
105. Id.
106. Md. Code Ann., Fain. Law § 5-706.1(b) provides, in pertinent part, as
follows:
(b)(1) In the case of a finding of indicated abuse or neglect,
an individual may request a contested case hearing to appeal the
finding in accordance with Title 10, Subtitle 2 of the State
Government Article by responding to the notice of the local
department in writing within 60 days.
(3)(i) If a criminal proceeding is pending on charges arising
out of the alleged abuse or neglect, the Office of Administrative
Hearings shall stay the hearing until a final disposition is made.
(ii) If after final disposition of the criminal charge, the
individual requesting the hearing is found guilty of any criminal
charge arising out of the alleged abuse or neglect, the Office of
Administrative Hearings shall dismiss the administrative appeal.
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §5-706(l)(b) (West 2009).
statutory requirements for dismissal, the Maryland Court of Special
Appeals noted:
We apply a limited standard of review and will not
disturb an administrative decision on appeal "if
substantial evidence supports factual findings and no
error of law exists." "[I]f the issue before the
administrative body is 'fairly debatable', that is, that
its determination involved testimony from which a
reasonable man could come to different conclusions,
the courts will not substitute their judgment for that of
the administrative body." We are under no constraint,
however, " 'to affirm an agency decision premised
solely upon an erroneous conclusion of law."'' 10 7
V. NON-CENTRAL PANEL STATES:
A sampling of the states which only employ agency-based
hearing personnel rather than an independent central hearing panel
used by many agencies, reveals that the approach taken by the
appellate courts is similar to that taken by central-panel jurisdictions.
West Virginia takes a divided approach to the deference question,
similar to that of Texas. It grants great deference to decisions of fact
and credibility rendered by a Hearing Examiner or Administrative
Law Judge, requiring a showing of clear error before the decision is
set aside. Unlike Maryland, however, which still grants some
deference, the courts require a de novo review of conclusions of law
and application of the law to the facts, granting no deference to the
agency determination whatsoever. In Graham v. Putnam County
Board of Education, the court considered a final decision made by an
ALJ for the Education and State Employee's Grievance Board finding
that the county board of education had properly suspended a
principal.'08 The Court found that the minimal due process
requirements were satisfied and rationalized:
107. Tabassi, 957 A.2d at 1007 (citations omitted).
108. Graham v. Putnam County Bd. of Educ., 575 S.E.2d 134 (W. Va. 2002).
Spring 2009 Is There a Deference?
38 journal of the National Association of Administrative Law judiciary
Grievance rulings involve a combination of both
deferential and plenary review. Since a reviewing
court is obligated to give deference to factual findings
rendered by an administrative law judge, a circuit
court is not permitted to substitute its judgment for
that of the hearing examiner with regard to factual
determinations. Credibility determinations made by an
administrative law judge are similarly entitled to
deference. Plenary review is conducted as to the
conclusions of law and application of law to the facts,
which are reviewed de novo .... [W]e conclude that
absent a showing of clear error, . . . the administrative
law judge's factual findings must stand. 109
Two years later, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
clarified its reasoning regarding the standard to be applied in another
case:
Additionally, in W. Va. Code 18-29-7, the Legislature
has indicated that the decision of a hearing examiner
should be final unless it is contrary to the law or that
the hearing examiner acted in excess of his statutory
authority, or that the decision was a result of fraud or
deceit, or was clearly wrong in view of the probative
and substantial evidence in the record as a whole, or,
finally, was arbitrary, capricious or characterized by
an abuse of discretion or by a clearly unwarranted
exercise of discretion. 110
The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals recently noted that:
Although the order of an ALJ is to be presumed prima
facie correct in an appeal of that order in the circuit
court, Ala. Code 1975, § 40-2A-9(g)(2), this court's
standard of review does not require that it give
109. Id. at 141 (emphasis in original).
110. Crow v. Wayne County Bd. of Educ., 599 S.E.2d 822, 824 (W. Va.
2004).
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deference to either the AL's decision or the circuit
court's judgment. Instead, because this is an appeal
from a summary judgment and involves only
questions of law, our review of the matter is de
novo. "11
The Court stressed that substantial deference was due to agency
decisions, and that these interpretations "must stand" if they are
reasonable. 112 The Court explained:
The fact that Alabama's "bad debt" regulation is not a
statute and is instead an administrative regulation does
not negate the overriding principles that guide us to
narrowly construe statutes providing for tax
exemptions, credits, and refunds, because
'regulations are regarded as having the force of law
and, therefore, become a part of the statutes
authorizing them." ' . . . In addition, " '[a]n agency's
interpretation of its own regulation must stand if it is
reasonable, even though it may not appear as
reasonable as some other interpretation." 113
Mississippi's Courts recently considered the deference question,
and took an extremely hard-line constitutionally based approach in
favor of the agencies right to interpret and apply their own rules and
regulations as well as relevant statutes. The Court stated:
In order to maintain the balance between the distinct
branches of government, this Court employs a limited
inquiry into administrative-agency decisions. "In
reviewing an administrative agency's findings of fact,
the [trial] court and this Court afford great deference
to an administrative agency's construction of its own
rules and regulations and the statutes under which it
111. State Dep't of Revenue v. Wells Fargo Fin. Acceptance Ala., Inc., 2008
WL 4952480, 6* (Ala. Civ. App. 2008).
112. Id.
113. Id. (citations omitted).
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operates." . . . However, an agency's interpretation of
its own regulation must be overturned if "so plainly
erroneous or so inconsistent with either the underlying
regulation or statute as to be arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance
with law." 114
New Hampshire, on the other hand, while acknowledging that
some deference to agency decisions is due, recently held that all
administrative decisions are reviewed by that Court de novo. In
Appeal of Vicky Morton, the Court stated:
We review the [agency's] interpretation of statutes
and administrative rules de novo. . . . In both
instances, we ascribe the plain and ordinary meanings
to words used, . . . looking at the rule or statutory
scheme as a whole, and not piecemeal .... Although
we accord deference to the [agency's] interpretation,
that deference is not absolute. We still examine its
interpretation to determine if it is consistent with the
language of the regulation and with the purpose the
regulation is intended to serve. 115
Colorado, although a central panel state, takes a similar
approach, requiring de novo review of an agency's
interpretation. In Benuishis v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office
of State, the Colorado Court of Appeals stated:
We review an agency's statutory and regulatory
interpretations de novo. Our primary task in
interpreting regulations is to give effect to the intent of
the enacting body. To discern that intent, we first look
at the plain language of the regulation and interpret its
114. Limbert v. Miss. Univ. for Women Alumnae Ass'n, Inc., 998 So.2d 993,
1000 (Miss. 2008).
115. Appeal of Vicky Morton, 960 A.2d 332, 334 (N.H. 2008)
(citations omitted).
terms in accordance with their commonly accepted
meanings. 116
In Commissioner, Environmental and Public Protection
Cabinet v. Sierra Club, the Kentucky Appellate Court noted
as follows:
In reviewing an agency's decision, we must determine
whether the action taken by the agency was arbitrary..
. . An action is arbitrary if it is not based on substantial
evidence in the record. Substantial evidence is defined
as evidence that "when taken alone or in the light of
all the evidence, it has sufficient probative value to
induce conviction in the minds of reasonable men."..
* If we determine that there is substantial evidence to
support the agency's decision, we must determine
whether the agency was correct in its application of
the law to the facts. 117
The Court, however, added this caveat:
[C]ourts are.., required to give the words of a statute
their plain meaning, which prevents a court from
adding language to the statute which does not
presently exist." An agency is bound by the
regulations it promulgates and regulations adopted by
an agency have the force and effect of law. . . . An
agency's interpretation of its regulations is valid,
however, only if it complies with the actual language
of the regulation.1 8
In a recent decision, the Virginia Court recognized the need for
"great" deference to agency interpretations of its own regulations due
to the expertise of the agency that created the regulation. In Board of
116. Benuishis v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office of State, 195 P.3d 1142, 1145
(Colo. App. 2008) (citations omitted).
117. Envtl. & Pub. Prot. Cabinet v. Sierra Club, 2008 WL 4270096, 3* (Ky.
App. 2008) (depublished).
118. Id. (citations omitted).
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Supervisors of Culpeper County v. State Building Code Technical
Review Board, the Court noted that this did not release the reviewing
courts from their responsibilities. 11 9 The court explained:
The circuit court nonetheless deferred to the Technical
Review Board's reasoning, correctly noting that courts
give "great deference" to an agency's interpretation of
its own regulations. This deference stems from Code §
2.2-4027, which requires that reviewing courts "take
due account" of the "experience and specialized
competence of the agency" promulgating the
regulation. 120
The Court continued:
Even so, "deference is not abdication, and it requires
us to accept only those agency interpretations that are
reasonable in light of the principles of construction
courts normally employ."'1 21
Finally, the Culpeper County court cautioned agencies about the
potential for overreaching their authority and responsibilities:
No matter how one calibrates judicial deference, the
administrative power to interpret a regulation does not
include the power to rewrite it. When a regulation is
"not ambiguous," judicial deference "to the agency's
position would be to permit the agency, under the
guise of interpreting a regulation, to create de facto a
new regulation." Though agencies may be tempted to
adjudicate their way around unwanted regulations,
119. Bd. of Supervisors v. State Bldg. Code Tech. Review Bd., 663 S.E.2d
571, 574 (Va. App. 2008).
120. Id. at 574 (citations omitted).
121. Id. (citations omitted), but compare Justice Scalia's earlier concern about
courts abdicating their responsibilities by accepting deference. Antonin Scalia,
Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 Duke L.J. 511,
514 (1989) ("But to say that those views, if at least reasonable, will ever be
binding-that is, seemingly, a striking abdication of judicial responsibility.").
such overreaching undermines the notice and public
hearing procedures of the rulemaking process-thereby
putting in jeopardy the "enhanced political
accountability of agency policy decisions adopted
through the rulemaking process" and the democratic
virtue of allowing "all potentially affected members of
the public an opportunity to participate in the process
of determining the rules that affect them."1 22
VI. CONCLUSION
The remaining states approach deference in a similar manner to
those listed above, applying a substantial evidence test, and requiring
clear error before reversing the agency determination. Accordingly,
individual discussion of each state would be cumulative. Surprisingly
lacking from these decisions, other than those from Washington
D.C., is any significant discussion of the nature of the decision
maker. Courts review administrative decisions and grant deference in
varied ways, but it seems that each jurisdiction applies an internally
consistent approach, and it makes no difference whether a central
panel ALJ, an agency-employed hearing officer, or an agency head
makes the ultimate decision.
The entire justification for the concept of deference to an
agency's determinations rests upon the individual agency's
specialized knowledge of the subject matter area within which it
functions. Obviously, constant exposure results in the development of
expertise in the area. When an agency head delegates decision
making authority to an independent agency, such as a central hearing
panel, however, the actual decision maker frequently has no
definitive experience in the field at issue, and makes the decision
predicated solely upon the testimony presented and the controlling
regulations and statutes and the manner in which these were applied
to the facts of the case at hand. As the D.C. Court of Appeals pointed
out in Washington v. District of Columbia Department of Public
Works, an ALJ employed by an independent central panel hears
appeals involving a substantial number of different agencies. 123 For
122. Bd. of Supervisors, 663 S.E.2d at 574 (citations omitted).
123. D.C. Dep't of Pub. Works, 954 A.2d at 945.
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this reason, it seems incongruous to assume that an ALJ would have
the same depth of subject matter knowledge and expertise with
respect to the issues in question as would the agency itself. This is
not as significant a concern when the ALJ renders a recommended
decision and the agency, which presumably has expertise in the area,
makes the final determination; it would seem to be, however, when
the ALJ makes the final agency decision.
Many of the states do indicate that the level of experience and
expertise is a significant factor in determining the level of deference
the court will apply. The Virginia courts addressed the issue in
Culpepper County, but referred to the agency itself, and there is no
mention of the nature of the decision maker. ("This deference stems
from Code § 2.2-4027, which requires that reviewing courts "take
due account" of the "experience and specialized competence of the
agency" promulgating the regulation.") 124 Similarly, the Maryland
Court of Appeals, in Trinity Assembly of God of Baltimore City, Inc.
v. People's Counsel for Baltimore County, noted that an agency's
determination should always receive some consideration, but added
that in analyzing whether an agency's decision was premised on an
erroneous legal conclusion, the court must take into consideration the
"relevant expertise of the agency."' 125 In County of Dane v. Labor
and Industry Review Commission, the Wisconsin courts provide that
the level of deference granted depends on the agency's expertise in
the area in question ("A reviewing court accords an interpretation of
a statute by an administrative agency one of three levels of
deference-great weight, due weight or no deference-based on the
agency's expertise in the area of law at issue."). 126
It is clear from this analysis that the concept of deference to
decisions made by state administrative agencies is alive and well. It is
equally clear, however, that the courts are "all over the place" with
regard to whether, or how much weight to afford an agency decision
in any given situation. Further, as the Central Panel approach grows,
the appellate courts will be forced to develop an approach to the
124. Bd. of Supervisors, 663 S.E.2d at 574 (quoting Va. Real Estate Bd. v.
Clay, 384 S.E.2d 622, 627 (Va. App. 1989) (interpreting former Code § 9-
6.14:17)).
125. Trinity Assembly of God of Balt. City, Inc. v. People's Counsel, 962
A.2d 404 (Md. 2008).
126. County of Dane, 744 N.W.2d at 615.
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amount of deference granted that appropriately reflects the decision-
maker's level of expertise, whether that decision-maker be an
independent ALJ or the agency itself. Until such time as the state
courts, and eventually the Supreme Court of the United States,
develop such guidelines for the reviewing courts, however, it seems
that the level of deference will remain a matter of the reviewing
court's individual preference.

